模糊因子下知识产权保护与侵犯的动态博弈分析

针对知识产权屡禁不止的侵权行为现状,运用模糊数学、数理统计方法和博弈论原理,从知识产权保护和侵犯双方效用及模型出发,以系统和动态的视角对双方行为进了博弈分析.研究结果表明保护与侵犯构成为一对均衡策略状态,其主要原因在于一定条件下,保护方期望的效用均衡处于低水平态势,从而提出在效用模糊因子的调整中不断提高保护方的动态效用水平是推进有效保护知识产权的动力途径.     

A note on a core catcher of a cooperative game

In Driessen (1986) it is shown that for games satisfying a certain condition the core of the game is included in the convex hull of the set of certain marginal worth vectors of the game, while it is conjectured that the inclusion holds without any condition on the game. In this note it is proved that the inclusion holds for all games.

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Zusammenfassung In Driessen (1986) wurde für Spiele, die eine gewisse Bedingung erfüllen, gezeigt, da\ der Kern des Spieles in der konvexen Hülle von gewissen Vektoren der Marginalwerte liegt. Es wurde vermutet, da\ diese Inklusion ohne weitere Bedingung an das Spiel gilt. In dieser Note wird nun gezeigt, da\ die Inklusion für alle Spiele gilt.

     

非紧超凸度量空间中的一个新的极大元定理及其对抽象经济的应用

在非紧超凸度量空间中建立了一个新的极大元定理.作为应用，获得了连续选择及其不动点定理和一个Browder-Fan不动点定理.最后，新建了非紧超凸度量空间中的定性对策和抽象经济的平衡点存在定理.     

防范道德风险的博弈分析和契约设计

运用不完全信息动态博弈的理论，建立了一个防范道德风险的博弈模型．给出了该博弈的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡．在此基础上给出了基于最优博弈策略的契约的具体形式。而这种基于博弈论的契约可以克服有成本的状态验证模型(CSV)及经典激励理论中承诺的可信性问题。     

基于利率市场化的银行贷款竞争导向定价策略研究

本文着重对两个银行之间竞争导向定价策略博弈行为进行了分析，认为在利率管制条件下，银行难以运用利率杠杆在信贷市场进行有效竞争；利率市场化之后，监管者不再对利率进行约束，银行信贷竞争的广度和深度都会随之加大。因此价格竞争将是银行信贷市场竞争的常态。     

Numerical techniques for finding equilibrium in von Neumann’s model

Numerical methods for finding an equilibrium position in von Neumann’s multisector economy model are proposed. They can be implemented using computers with floating-point arithmetic. The proposed methods are based on reducing the problem to solving the corresponding matrix games.     

Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains

We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and the reconfirmation property. These properties also characterize the core on certain subsets of games, e.g., on the set of totally balanced games, on the set of balanced games, and on the set of superadditive games. Suitable extensions of these properties yield an axiomatization of the core on sets of nontransferable utility games. Received September 1999/Final version December 2000     

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.     

Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance. In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived.     

舰艇对抗微分对策建模研究

编队舰艇对抗攻击瞬时运动状态过程的完整描述是一个尚未很好解决的技术难点，本就驱逐舰对多艘导弹快挺对抗攻击建模问题进行了研究，建立了攻击时间尽可能短的定量微分对策模型，并给出了具体实现方法，中模型和方法可为实时舰艇作战指挥系统的研制、开发提供技术支持及理论依据。